Case information

Criminal law — Sentencing — Consideration of facts forming part of circumstances of offence — Agreement entered into by prosecutor and accused regarding guilty plea — Whether evidence of facts that demonstrate offence with which offender was initially charged, but which is no longer pending and for which there was no verdict, is admissible as aggravating factor for sentencing pursuant to s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code — What are duties of fairness of prosecutor who intends to use s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code to prove such offence as aggravating factor in sentencing following guilty plea? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 725(1)(c).

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The respondent, Enrico Di-Paola, is a construction contractor committed for trial on four charges related to a corruption and fraud matter involving an official with whom he was doing business and with whom he had a friendship. The day before his trial, Mr. Di-Paola entered into a negotiated agreement with the prosecutor to plead guilty to a charge of having conferred a benefit on an official while having dealings with the government and without the written consent of the official’s superior (s. 121(1)(b)), and the prosecutor dropped the more serious charges. The prosecutor amended the indictment in accordance with the agreement.

Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment on Mr. Di-Paola. The judge accepted as one of the aggravating factors the fact that Mr. Di-Paola had conferred advantages and benefits on the official in consideration of the awarding of lucrative contracts by the official. The Court of Appeal reduced the length of the conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed on Mr. Di-Paola from 15 months to 6 months, finding that the trial judge had erred in principle in accepting aggravating facts associated with another charge that had previously been laid and that had not been carried over in accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties.