Case information

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Case summaries are prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). Please note that summaries are not provided to the Judges of the Court. They are placed on the Court file and website for information purposes only.

Criminal law - Trial - Charge to jury - Response to jury question - Offences - Elements of offence - Murder - Manslaughter - Where the trial judge directs the jury that the only verdict open to it is to find the accused guilty of either murder or manslaughter, is the trial judge obligated as a matter of law to also instruct the jury on the legal definitions and elements of both of those offences? - Where a jury’s only function is to determine if the accused is guilty of either murder or manslaughter and the trial judge does not instruct the jury of the legal definition and elements of manslaughter in his original charge, is there an obligation to do so when the jury, during deliberations, makes a specific request for the definition of manslaughter and seeks an explanation as to the difference between the offences of murder and manslaughter?

While at a party, the Appellant picked up a pickaxe that was at hand and either threw it in the victim’s direction or wielded it directly at the victim’s head. The pickaxe penetrated the victim’s skull and caused his death. At trial, the Appellant admitted throwing the pickaxe in the victim’s general direction, thinking it was a baseball bat, although his position was that he did not have the requisite intent for murder. After deliberating, the jury asked the trial judge to explain the difference between second degree murder and manslaughter, asked for examples, and asked for a specific definition of manslaughter. The trial judge responded by explaining that the difference between the two was “the accused’s mental state”. He then read from his original instruction on the mental state required for second degree murder, and declined to give a specific definition of manslaughter on the basis that the Criminal Code contains no such definition. The Appellant was convicted of second degree murder. On appeal, the Appellant argued various grounds of appeal with respect to the trial judge’s charge to the jury. The majority of the Court of Appeal found only one ground of appeal to be arguable, namely the appropriateness of the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question. The majority found the trial judge’s response to the question to be reasonable, and the appeal was dismissed. O’Brien, J.A., dissenting, found the trial judge’s response to the question to be neither complete nor comprehensive, and he thus concluded that the help to which the jury was entitled was not provided. He would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.